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desertion in Pavel Pryazhko’s The Soldier
James Rowson
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ABSTRACT
Over the past twenty years, a collection of theatre makers in Russia 
have staged suppressed and marginalised voices to engage with 
the political and social realities of contemporary Russia. The work of 
these innovative theatre practitioners has been collated under the 
idiom of New Drama (Novaya Drama). Previous studies of New 
Drama have placed an emphasis on the role of the text and the 
playwright’s dynamic use of contemporary language. While 
acknowledging that these are important features of the New 
Drama repertoire, this article provides an alternative approach by 
examining the work of Pavel Pryazhko. This article explores 
Pryazhko’s The Soldier (Soldat, 2011), in the context of the Second 
Chechen War and Vladimir Putin’s revivification of the military in 
the public sphere. Through a detailed study of The Soldier in per-
formance, this article contends that the production’s content and 
form is vital in generating an oppositional discourse about the role 
of the military in contemporary Russian society. Pryazhko’s esche-
wal of traditional notions of theatrical language and dialogic inter-
action in The Soldier disrupts the audience’s expectations of what 
a theatre performance is, and subsequently facilitates a wider dia-
logue about the Kremlin’s privileging of the military in Russia.
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We must explain to the entire generation of young people that the question of whether or 
not to serve in the army should not even come for a young person to begin with. We must all 
realize that without the army there would be no country. Nobody should have the slightest 
doubt on this score. No army, no Russia. (Vladimir Putin speaking with representative of 
a pro-presidential youth group in May 2006. Quoted in Blum 2006, 2)
On 1 October 1999, approximately 50,000 Russian soldiers advanced over the 
Dagestani-Chechen boarder, marking the start of the ground campaign of what would 
become known as the Second Chechen War (1999–2009). Three years earlier, the First 
Chechen War (1994–1996) had ended with a humiliating and unimaginable defeat for the 
Russian army and the Yeltsin administration after the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
the Chechen capital of Grozny in the face of pervasive public opinion against the war. 
Although Vladimir Putin officially concluded the end of the Second Chechen War in 
April 2002, the horrifying brutality of the military campaign meant that it became 
a paramount and defining juncture of his first two terms in office during the 2000s. 
The war was fundamental in shaping the nascent foundations of the Putin regime and 
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provided a pretext for the state’s diminution of press freedoms and independent corre-
spondence. Putin freely exploited military symbols and rhetoric as part of a political 
strategy to create legitimacy for his own power. As Russian human rights activist Sergei 
Kovalev argues, Putin ‘owes his accession to the presidency largely to his backing of the 
war’ (Kovalev 2000). As this essay will explore, the war provided the place for a more 
prominent role for the military in Putin’s state-building strategy in the 2000s, which 
included a re-emphasis on mandatory conscription as a patriotic duty required by all 
young Russian men.
When Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as President of Russia in December 1999, military 
success in Chechnya was his highest priority. He viewed the Second Chechen War as the 
defining feature in his incipient stage of securing power. Speaking in 2000, he reflected 
that ‘my mission, my historical mission – and this will sound lofty, but it’s true – 
consisted of resolving the situation in the Northern Caucasus’ (Putin 2000, 139). The 
war came to define not only Putin’s first tentative months in power, but also his 
presidency and domestic policies throughout his entire first term in office from the end 
of 1999 to 2004. The outbreak of the war saw the first gagging of the Russian media by 
Putin, with reporters pressurised to capitalise on the patriotic sentiment that swept 
through Russia in the early months of the conflict. Putin learnt from the mistakes 
made by the Yeltsin administration during the first Chechen war, which had been 
undone by public opinion in Russia, swayed by graphic and critical news reports from 
leading television networks. In the state media, Putin visually aligned himself with the 
war effort and the Russian troops fighting on the front line, engaging in grand theatrical 
spectacles that included flying into Chechnya in the co-pilot seat of a Su-25 jet a week 
prior to the presidential elections in March 2000. Putin came to embody the Russian war 
effort: ‘Though Putin has little in common with military heroes,’ (Goscilo 2013, 184) 
writes Helena Goscilo, ‘the huge gallery of his PR photographs leaves no doubts that he 
appreciates the psychological significance of the next best thing – the spectacle of a leader 
wearing camouflage, owning a military-style Lada jeep, clutching weapons, and visiting 
army bases’ (184).
The continued use of conscripted soldiers by the Kremlin in the Second Chechen War 
brought a renewed debate about desertion by young men who did not want to serve in the 
Russian army. Despite military rules barring new recruits from serving in conflict zones, 
conscripted soldiers were sent to fight on the front lines in Grozny and other areas of 
conflict. The Kremlin’s re-emphasis on mandatory conscription as a patriotic duty 
required by all young Russian men underscored the political nature of serving in the 
Russian army. As Valerie Sperling writes in her book Sex, Politics and Putin: Political 
Legitimacy, ‘in the eyes of the Kremlin, army service and submission to military con-
scription are both direct forms of supporting the state’ (Sperling 2014, 129). Moreover, 
Peter Baker and Susan Glasser have conducted vital research into desertion in the 
Russian army in the 2000s, linking the rising phenomenon to the violent hazing of 
young conscripts by their seniors known as dedovshchina (Baker and Glasser 2004, 
198). This brutal aspect of military service that has been ingrained into the Russian 
army since before the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been linked to a list of 
shocking statistics, prompting Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya to ask the question: 
‘what would you think of an army in which, in a single year, 2002, a battalion, more than 
500 men, had been killed not fighting a war but from beatings?’ (Politkovskaya 2004, 3). 
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Richard Sakwa further records that 1,000 conscript soldiers a year committed suicide 
throughout the 2000s ‘as a result of various barbaric initiation ceremonies and dedovsh-
china’ (Sakwa 2008, 396).
Against this controversial background of military conscription has been the revivifica-
tion of the military and soldiers’ bodies in public performances and spaces. The auxesis of 
the annual commemoration of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War on 
9 May has formed a central pillar of Putin’s societal rehabilitation of the military in the 
2000s and 2010s. The spectacle is a panoply of the country’s military strength and by 
proxy has aggressively reaffirmed the importance of Putin to Russia’s re-emergence on 
the world stage. Bolstered by state media, the Kremlin have also organised a number of 
theatrical military spectacles in public spaces that have served as patriotic propaganda to 
promote a militarised ideal of masculinity and legitimise the ideology of the Russian 
government. In addition, Pro-Putin youth groups such as Nashi (Ours) and its militant 
wing Stal (Steel) have portrayed a militarised hegemonic masculinity through public 
activism that includes gatherings of young activists dressed in military uniform. In this 
way, the state’s promotion of military patriotism and masculinity is achieved through the 
mediatised and embodied presence of the male soldier, as well as Putin’s own martial 
public performances. These theatrical spectacles have aimed to distort and conceal more 
violent aspects of the military, including acts of dedovshchina and their psychological 
impact on young conscript soldiers. Instead, the Kremlin has fabricated a sanitised 
narrative for mass audiences, which propagates militarised masculinity and remains 
central to Putin’s state-building strategy and the advance of authoritarian and centralised 
power structures in the country.
It is within this context that Pavel Pryazhko’s play The Soldier (Soldat, 2011) raises 
urgent questions about the purpose of the Russian army’s continuing policy of conscript-
ing young men. The Soldier is a collaboration between Belarusian playwright Pryazhko 
and Russian director Dmitry Volkostrelov. Pryazhko emerged as an important voice in 
Russian-language playwriting in the mid-2000s. His theatre is synonymous with the work 
of a collection of practitioners that has been collated under the idiom of New Drama 
(Novaya Drama). Emerging in the early 2000s during a period of volatile social and 
political change in the country, New Drama was responsible for drawing a younger 
audience to the theatre and reviving Russian drama at a time when many critics argued 
that dramatic writing and production had stagnated. As Amy Skinner has recently 
observed, the historically dominant role of the stage director in Russia has exerted 
a ‘significant influence’ over the development of the nation’s theatre practice in the 
twentieth century and beyond, which has privileged a ‘director’s theatre’ over the play-
wright in the creative process (Skinner 2019, 2). New Drama instead established itself as 
a playwright-led development that emphasises the writer’s creative practice and potential. 
A new generation of dramatists who had come of age after the collapse of communism 
began to use contemporary parlance in their plays to tell stories that reflected the 
changing class structures in post-Soviet Russia and highlighted the relatable experiences 
of individuals excluded from public discourse and space. The protagonists in early New 
Drama plays were often the product of the Russia’s turbulence development of a free 
market, capitalist economy, living in the violent and hyper-sexualised world of the 
provinces. The graphic portrayal of these lives on stage made visible a demographic 
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that had been marginalised and disadvantaged by the emergence of the neoliberal policies 
of the Putin era, revealing the corruption and social inequality of the early 2000s.
Using a variety of disparate theatrical techniques, New Drama writers depicted 
characters that spoke recognisable and realistic dialogue as well as conversational lan-
guage familiar to young Russians. For example, theatre critic Alena Karas sees the 
primary appeal of New Drama arising from its forceful portrayal of ‘authentic street 
language’ (‘nastoyashchim yazykom ulits’) used in twenty-first century Russia and the 
frequent and affective use of violent sexualised language (Karas 2004). These innovative 
new linguistic aesthetics provided the opportunity for playwrights to base their work on 
their actual lived experiences and experiment with the expression of new forms of social 
critique. In doing so, New Drama writers have provocatively confronted political injus-
tices and widening social inequality, challenging Putin’s autocratic rule and official state- 
sanctioned rhetoric that has aimed to divide individuals across the country.
Pryazhko’s diverse output spans longer texted-based productions to shorter perfor-
mances that play with theatrical form and challenge the structure of New Drama.1 As 
John Freedman contends, ‘over the years [Pryazhko’s] plays have grown and transformed 
into a body of work as unique and influential as that of any other playwright of his time’ 
(Freedman 2014a, 110). Despite this, however, there are limited English- language studies 
that consider Pryazhko and his theatrical output.2 This article aims to fill a gap in that 
scholarship and expand on previous English-language work on new theatre writing in 
Russia by examining The Soldier in relation to Vladimir Putin’s fervent revivification of 
militarised patriotism and the complex legacy of the Second Chechen War.
The Soldier premiered at Teatr.doc in central Moscow on 23 December 2011 and was 
staged in an unused office space next to the theatre’s main performance space, which is 
where I first saw the production in November 2012. The show consists of fifteen minutes 
of silent, diurnal actions performed by a single actor with only one line of text spoken at 
the end, depicting a young conscript soldier’s final agonising moments before he takes 
the courageous decision to desert from the Russian army. Drawing on a close reading of 
my own experiences of attending performances of The Soldier at Teatr.doc,3 this article 
investigates how the production provides a vital critique of one of the core institutional 
foundations of the Putin regime, the role of the military in contemporary Russian life, 
through its generation of an oppositional discourse about it. I argue that the play 
foregrounds the status of the Second Chechen War as an important facet in Putin’s 
political legitimacy and leadership, as well the lack of official acknowledgement of the 
experiences of Russian veterans of the Chechen Wars (Chechentsy). Moreover, this study 
considers how by removing the playtext and challenging its audience’s pre-conceived 
understanding of New Drama, Pryazhko provokes a crucial reinterpretation of the 
increasingly autocratic politics of the Putin regime. Previous studies of New Drama 
have placed an emphasis on the role of the text and the playwright’s dynamic use of 
contemporary language. While acknowledging that these are important features of the 
New Drama repertoire, I aim to facilitate a wider discussion on how The Soldier directly 
interrogates the strengthening of the army and patriotic values in twenty-first century 
Russia. In this way, I will demonstrate the political potency of New Drama in its 
facilitation of the creation of new discourses on contemporary Russian politics that run 
in opposition to the established rhetoric of the Putin regime.
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In the next section of this article, I will historicise the development of New Drama in 
light of how these practitioners have positioned their work as a profound shift in 
theatrical conventions and practices. I will suggest that The Soldier represents 
a departure from the New Drama canon that redefines notions of dramatic language 
and the artistic role of the playwright in contemporary Russia. The following section 
provides a detailed analysis of my own experience of attending The Soldier, contextualis-
ing how the nuanced performance of a private moment provides a radical rejection of the 
Kremlin’s wider militarised rhetoric and Putin’s own heavily mediatised public perfor-
mances during the Second Chechen War. I then examine how the production’s content 
and form provokes a challenge to audience members’ notions of theatre, arguing that The 
Soldier provides a vital artistic engagement with the politics of the Putin regime and the 
restoration of militarised patriotism through its staging strategies and communicative 
silence. In the final section, I draw on Maya Eichler’s study Militarizing Men: Gender, 
Conscription and War in Post-Soviet Russia to analyse how The Soldier intervenes in 
Putin’s public reframing of patriotism and reinforcement of militarised gender norms by 
subverting idealised stereotypes of hegemonic masculinity. By examining representations 
of military tropes in The Soldier, this article demonstrates New Drama’s capacity to both 
interrogate substantive political anxieties and foreground the experiences of marginalised 
citizens. This serves to provide a specific reflection on the artistic evolution of New 
Drama, as it continues to remain at the forefront of experimental theatrical practice in 
Russia.
New Russian drama
‘New Drama for me means simply that there are new plays’, remarks influential theatre 
director Kirill Serebrennikov when providing his appraisal of the New Drama form 
(Serebrennikov 2009, 9). Reflecting on the explosion of new theatre writing that occurred 
in Russia in the 2000s, Serebrennikov observes that, in his opinion, ‘New Drama is 
a transitional phenomenon; the term should be forgotten, or applied to the late 1990s and 
early 2000s’ (Serebrennikov 2009, 9). Notably, John Freedman refutes Serebrennikov’s 
laconic assertion: Freedman contends that New Drama can in fact be defined through 
a number of important recurring thematic characteristics and linguistic traits, noting that 
‘whether you like it or not, New Drama is not all modern Russian drama’ (Freedman 
2011). While the aim of this study is not to consider what constitutes a piece of New 
Drama, Serebrennikov and Freedman’s conflicting comments are significant in the 
context of this article. Their claims both highlight a dynamic shift in the dramatic 
landscape that occurred at the turn of the millennium, which saw the emergence of 
a new playwriting culture and the revival of the playwright in the Russian theatre. As 
I have noted above, Russian theatre has historically emphasised the director as the 
primary creative force in the facilitation of new work. This unexpected artistic develop-
ment triggered a vigorous debate amongst critics and practitioners about the creative role 
and function of the writer in dramatic practice, resulting in the creation of a new cultural 
discourse on contemporary Russian drama.
The rise of new playwriting in the early 2000s was facilitated by the artistic ambition of 
a collection of writers to repudiate the thematic and aesthetic constraints that had been 
previously been placed on Russian theatre by Soviet censorship and to redefine creative 
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practices that had long existed in the country. Inspired by a series of workshops staged by 
the Royal Court Theatre’s International Department in 1999 and 2000, these dynamic 
writers created plays that expose and indict aspects of social atrophy and institutional 
corruption under the presidency of Vladimir Putin.4 Originally applied by theatre 
practitioners eager to brand and promote this boom in new writing, the New Drama 
idiom was seized upon by theatre critics and journalists who viewed this burgeoning 
cultural phenomenon as an exciting and controversial revolution in Russian theatre.5 
New Drama emerged as a playwright-led development that privileged the writer in the 
creative process. During this period, a number of playwrights including Elena Gremina, 
Mikhail Ugarov, Alexei Kazantsev, and Nikolai Kolyada founded their own independent 
studio theatres and started directing their own work.6 The establishment of a number of 
playwriting festivals including the Lyubimovka New Play Festival and the May Readings 
Festival in Togliatti additionally offered writers the chance to have their worked per-
formed in the development stage of the creative process in immensely popular informal 
readings. These new performance spaces and festivals were created with the playwright at 
the center of the artistic process, allowing for a more collaborative and flexible approach 
to theatre-making. They provided a new generation of young and inexperienced writers 
with a creative outlet to stage their own productions, develop their craft through 
rehearsed readings, and experiment with new aesthetics.
Writing in the ‘New Drama Manifesto’ (Manifest Novoi Drami), Ugarov explicitly 
foregrounds how the ‘rejection of contemporary authors by the theatre’ has served as 
a provocation for the movement (Ugarov 2004). In other words, Ugarov positions the 
work of New Drama practitioners as a profound rejection of dominant dramaturgies and 
creative ways of working. His assertion points to the fact that since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union programmes at repertory theatres have been dominated by revivals of 
canonical texts and authors. As Eduard Boyakov, founder of Praktika Theatre and the 
New Drama Festival, observed in 2006: ‘most directors are too intimidated to stage 
daring and controversial modern plays, preferring either to hide behind the big names 
of the past or indulge in fantasy’ (quoted in Ross 2006, 34–5). Moreover, the fostering of 
a dialogue with active playwrights has historically never been a priority in the formal 
education of directors and actors. This has famously resulted in Russian directors 
assuming the role of auteurs, whose control and authority over the production is 
unquestioned.7 By creating a new set of theatrical conventions and experimenting with 
daring forms of socially-engaged theatre, New Drama has helped to disrupt the tradi-
tional status quo of the country’s state-theatres and established itself as arguably the most 
influential artistic movement in contemporary Russia. It represents a radically profound 
shift in the cultural and artistic landscape, which has fundamentally reinscribed how 
theatre and performance is created, programmed, and understood.
Critics were quick to label and define the linguistic features of New Drama, fore-
grounding the use of quotidian language, contemporary Russian vernacular, and 
obscene profanities, known in Russian as mat.8 Birgit Beumers and Mark 
Lipovetsky’s pioneering study Performing Violence: Literary and Theatrical 
Experiments of New Russian Drama – which remains the only full-length English 
language study of New Drama – provides a further nuanced exploration and emphasis 
on the role of the text and the dynamic use of contemporary language in New Drama. 
Beumers and Lipovetsky contextualise the movement within the framework of violence 
6 J. ROWSON
in Soviet and post-Soviet society, analysing how playwrights have articulated cultural 
and linguistic developments in modern Russia. Examining the work of writers includ-
ing Vasilii Sigarev, Ivan Vyrypaev, and Vladimir and Oleg Presniakov, they argue that 
‘the emergence of drama as one of the most innovative genres in the new millennium 
may be explained by the need to test new forms of social communication’ (2009, 135). 
They further underscore the playwrights’ use of language as the leading creative 
component of the movement, attending to the role of text-based dramaturgy in 
exposing ‘discourses of violence’ in Russia (Beumers and Lipovetsky 2009, 301). 
Thus, Beumers and Lipovetsky contend that: ‘New Drama has served one major 
purpose: to innovate both dramatic and theatrical language’ (Beumers and 
Lipovetsky 2009, 301).
In this paper I want to move beyond the important analysis of the linguistic potential 
of New Drama to establish a wider basis for understanding the significance of the 
movement in relation to the increasingly coercive and nationalistic politics of the Putin 
regime. I suggest that Pryazhko’s The Soldier is an example that demonstrates how New 
Drama does not always depend on the presence of a theatrical text in its innovative 
staging of contemporary Russian politics and society. Instead, the performance focuses 
on witnessing the everyday acts of a young conscript soldier in a quiet and intimate space 
that heighten the tension and poignancy inherent in the situation Pryazhko presents. 
I argue that The Soldier takes a radically disparate theatrical form and structure to 
previous New Drama productions to call into question the dominant representations 
of the Chechen Wars, militarised patriotism, and conscription propagated by the 
Kremlin to silences alternative ideologies and experiences. In the remainder of the article, 
therefore, I will explore the implications of the production on the evolution and defini-
tion of New Drama by examining how the piece provides a vital artistic engagement with 
the politics of the Putin regime, provoking a wider debate on how the autocratic nature of 
the Government can be challenged and subverted. I will start by providing a detailed 
analysis of my own experience of attending The Soldier, focusing on how the nuanced 
performance of a private moment prompts reflection on the wider official rhetoric of the 
state.
The performance: ‘He did not go back to the army’
The house lights are turned off on the small congregation gathered at Teatr.doc’s second 
space, and the audience’s attention is immediately drawn to the sound of running water 
occurring somewhere off stage. Initially, it is unclear if this is part of the show, but the 
answer is soon revealed by the broadcast of a live video feed that begins to play on a large 
projection screen hanging on the back wall of the space. On the screen, the audience sees 
a video of a naked young man with short, cropped blonde hair standing under a running 
shower (see Image 1). Most audience members will already be aware of the production’s 
title, so the obvious assumption made at this point in the performance is that the man 
who is visible in the film is a young soldier in the Russian army. The audience becomes 
aware that they are engaging in an act of voyeurism on a private moment of intense 
reflection as they watch the man, who is only filmed from the waist up, slowly and 
assiduously washing himself. As he showers, the young soldier appears to be caught in 
emotional turmoil. For long periods of time, he stands directly under the showerhead 
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staring upwards towards the ceiling in contemplation, spitting out the shower water that 
runs into his mouth. At other moments, he paces around the small cubicle, conveying 
what appears to be an inexorable and unspeakable anxiety.
At this point in the performance, I felt that the actor’s staged unease was mirrored by 
my own discomfort at witnessing this intimate act of ablution unfold. This unease was also 
Image 1. The Soldier (dir. Dmitry Volkostrelov), Teatr.doc, Moscow, 2011. Photo: Evgeny Lyulyukin. 
Courtesy of Teatr.doc.
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provoked by the theatrical anomaly of the performer’s absence from the stage and our only 
access to the action manifesting through the medium of film. This physical barrier between 
the actor’s actions offstage creates a frisson of anticipation as the audience wait for 
a revelation into the psyche of the character. In one review of the production, Marina 
Raikina (2011), arts editor of daily tabloid newspaper Moskovskij Komsomolets, describes 
her experience of watching the performance and trying to consider the antecedent events 
to justify the man’s agitation. She contends that it immediately raises questions about the 
negative perception of the army in contemporary Russia (Raikina 2011). As I have 
discussed above, the military has become a site of contested political narratives accruing 
from Putin’s prominent revivification of the military in civil society and his own publicity 
stunts that portray him as a decisive politician of action. While The Soldier never explicitly 
excoriates the Kremlin’s policies, the filming of an actor taking a shower offstage invites 
the audience to consider how the character’s assumed identity as a young soldier impacts 
on their consideration of his motives. Through just a title and the projected film of the 
habitual act of washing, the play already provokes important considerations of Putinism 
and a salient anxiety about the role of the military in contemporary Russian politics and 
society. It further underscores the tactics employed by the Kremlin and eschews the 
sensationalist and manipulated state coverage of the Second Chechen War that has served 
to reinforce the Putin regime’s coercive authoritarianism. By doing so, the performance 
encourages a critical reinterpretation of constructed spectacles of martial strength and 
conflict as they have occurred in twenty-first century Russia.
After around five minutes, the man turns off the shower and reaches for a towel that 
has been hanging out of shot. He undertakes the task of drying himself with the same 
sedulous attention as when washing, starting with his hair and meticulously working his 
way down his torso. The diurnal action played out in a typical domestic setting means 
that the audience search for meaning in every action taken by actor Pavel Chinarev. John 
Freedman observes that director of the piece, Volkostrelov, ‘had attuned our sense of 
hearing to nuances with the long, monotonous, but not entirely repetitive sound of 
running water [. . .] helping us to construct a detailed narrative in our minds’ (Freedman 
2014b, 51). Simultaneously, the detailed tight shot of the actor’s face and upper body 
irradiates every facial expression and physical action in greater clarity than if he was 
present on stage, highlighting the somatic narrative of Pryazhko’s play (see Image 2). The 
structure of the performance implies that, from the very start of The Soldier, the 
audience’s attention is focused on the corporeal semiotics of the actor’s body. 
Moreover, the live projection not only counters the sensationalist mainstream media 
coverage of the Second Chechen War but also invites the audience to consider the 
significance of how visual media can be constructed and manipulated to promote 
political interests and construct normative political discourses.
At this moment, a spot light is slowly raised on a small section of the performance 
space, illuminating the single piece of set dressing in the room: an office chair with an 
army uniform neatly folded over it. With the towel now wrapped around his waist the 
soldier emerges from the shower room and into the corridor becoming visible in the 
flesh to the audience for the first time. In this precise moment, he can be glimpsed both 
standing down the corridor while also still visible on the video stream, confirming to 
the audience that the projection they have been watching is live. He silently walks down 
the narrow hallway towards the audience in an understated manner before turning 
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right into a second room that is again hidden from sight. Unlike the shower room, 
however, this area is not filmed, and instead the audience must rely only on the sounds 
that he makes to infer the actions that are occurring. Although obscured from view, the 
sounds that emanate from the adjacent room are clear for everyone to recognise: 
Image 2. Pavel Chinarev in The Soldier, Teatr.doc, Moscow, 2011. Photo: Polina Koroleva. Courtesy of 
Teatr.doc.
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a microwave is being turned on and a hot drink is prepared. At this point, Volkostrelov 
inserts a deliberate lacuna in the physical narrative of the performance, as in contrast to 
the shower scene, we cannot see the young man’s actions or expressions in this second 
room. I was left wondering if something happened in that moment un-witnessed by the 
audience that could have impacted on the character’s final actions in the play.
These final moments occur as the young man enters the corridor again, standing at the 
entrance to the main performance space facing the audience. Under the bright spotlight 
he is still visibly wet from his preceding shower and remains undressed apart from the 
towel that conceals his body below the waist. Despite his heightened vulnerability, 
standing almost naked in front of an expectant crowd, he appears calm and collected, 
leaning against the door and surveying the room. After the prolonged silence, the 
audience hang on every word as finally he speaks slowly and purposefully, delivering 
the play’s two brief lines:
The soldier came home on leave. When it came time to return to the army, he did not go 
back to the army.9
He then steps back closing the door behind him, as the room fades to a black out.
Silence and debate: The Soldier in the new drama canon
The first question that needs to be addressed in a consideration of The Soldier is: how can 
a piece of theatre that eschews a conventional written playtext be included in the canon of 
New Drama, an idiom that specifically privileges the importance of language and the re- 
emergence of the playwright in contemporary Russian theatre? New Drama is 
a mercurial artistic term that describes manifold productions and theatrical genres. 
Writers rarely concentrate on one specific genre, often shifting between producing 
documentary theatre, comic satire, and plays with more experimental theatrical struc-
tures. Pryazhko himself asserts that New Drama can take varied theatrical forms and is 
defined by its consideration of the ‘everyday individual experience. The language and 
structure of the text can take any form you want. It’s not about them’ (2011).10 Theatre 
critic Pavel Rudnev has elaborated on this explanation, observing that Pryazhko’s theatre 
is directly responsible for the evolution of the New Drama repertoire and the theatrical 
conventions that define it:
Pryazhko was able to change the course of development of modern plays in Russia. He 
turned the ‘New Drama’ from the drama of the theme and the drama of the language, to 
a discussion around the structure of the modern play. He made the form of the text and the 
language of the play topics for discussion. Prior to Pryazhko, the ‘New Drama’ was clinging, 
first of all, to plots, boundary conditions. (Rudnev 2010)
For Rudnev, then, Pryazhko’s playful deconstruction of the established conventions of 
playwriting in twenty-first century Russia has resulted in the enlivening of a debate about 
the form and codification of New Drama.
I would further contend that Pryazhko’s engagement with the political and social 
realities in contemporary Russia in The Soldier unites the play with the diverse body of 
New Drama productions through its vital critique of Putin’s calculated reframing of the 
army and military institutions. In an interview given with journalist and theatre-maker 
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Tatiana Artimovich, Pryazhko discusses the original concept for the play: ‘I began to 
build a story,’ he contends, ‘I followed the conventions of plot construction and created 
some characters [. . .] and suddenly I realised that what I needed was only two sentences, 
and that this was the only option’ (quoted in Artimovich 2011). By condensing the show 
to fifteen minutes of action and two lines of text, Pryazhko directly addresses contem-
porary anxieties surrounding the Russian military, conscription, and desertion. The 
ephemeral performance directs the audience to consider the importance of the soldier’s 
reticence during the piece.
In her monograph Watching War on the Twenty-First Century Stage: Spectacles of 
Conflict, Clare Finburgh argues that since the start of the twenty-first century, military 
conflict and spectacle ‘have joined forces in way that are more powerful now, than ever’ 
(Finburgh 2017, 3). Finburgh suggests that as modern technology reinscribes how images 
of military conflict are broadcast and consumed by a mass audience, these spectacles are 
manipulated to maintain dominant political positions as well as for economic gain. She 
writes that: ‘Increasingly, war and its mediation as spectacle are difficult to separate out 
from one another, as the capacity of the media to shape public perception even to win 
wars, increases with the rise of the presence of those media’ (Finburgh 2017, 13). In her 
exploration of how war and conflict are manipulated for political gains, Finburgh 
illustrates how a variety of theatre productions have:
encouraged us to watch war and other forms of conflict and violence with more attention: 
attention to the ways in which what we watch is framed as spectacle, and how those 
spectacles might seek to impose certain ideologies on us; or else simply try to shift more 
newspapers off shelves or else attempt to attract more war watchers to channels, stations and 
website (Finburgh 2017, 12).
In other words, Finburgh maintains the importance of theatre as a site of intervention 
that generates crucial reflection and critique on the ways in which distorted spectacles of 
military conflict are represented by mainstream media.
In The Soldier, the powerful employment of unseen action that occurs offstage and the 
use of minimal speech challenges and resists the spectacle of military conflict in Putin’s 
Russia. Pryazhko and Volkostrelov knowingly reject the dominant spectacles of war 
constructed by centralised media throughout Putin’s presidency. By avoiding sensatio-
nalised images of war and conflict, The Soldier demonstrates how the public perception of 
military conflict and power can be distorted and challenged, prompting the audience to 
question the state’s wider use of oppressive measures to impose restrictive political 
narratives. By stripping back the performance and placing the everyday actions of 
a young soldier at the heart of the piece, the production resists and interrupts the 
overwhelming use of militarised patriotism that strengthen Putin’s grip on power. The 
camera’s instantaneous mediation of the soldier’s ritualised washing at the start of the 
performance captures the contrast between this private moment of cleansing and acts of 
institutional militarised violence. The live video projection prioritises the private realm 
offstage, visually navigating the intersection between the personal and political to take on 
a form of enacted private resistance and symbolically reinforcing how this act of purging 
oneself doubles as both a moment of personal reflection and a potent consideration of 
wider public manipulation. At the same time, this political act brings into focus how the 
military spectacles deployed by the state have legitimised the Putin regime, silencing 
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those who do not conform and labeling them as a dangerous fifth column in Russian 
society. In this way, the performance offers a crucial opportunity to expose the Kremlin’s 
revival of militarised propaganda and renegotiate the role of the military.
As I have detailed above, the legacy of the Second Chechen War has cast a prominent 
and enduring shadow over the development of the Russian state in the twenty-first 
century. As Dmitry Muratov soberly reflected in 2014: ‘all that is happening today is 
but a consequence of this war’ (Muratov 2014). The war consolidated Putin’s nascent 
presidency and enabled the Kremlin to purge the independent media empires that had 
emerged in the 1990s in a rescinding of press freedoms. In addition, the Kremlin 
recognised the value that militarised patriotism held in aggressively reaffirming the 
political status quo by demonising those who do not obsequiously conform to these 
principles. The communicative silence in The Soldier opens and augments potential 
reflection on the Russian military’s contentious engagements in Chechnya. The play 
has been acknowledged as one of the most politically provocative productions of the 
twenty-first century. Maria Shevtsova interprets The Soldier as ‘protest at its most matter- 
of-fact; protest that could not be denied’ (Shevtsova 2015). Writing in Teatr journal, 
Elena Levinskaia similarly contends that the play is an act of fulmination and 
a provocative ‘manifesto, a radical gesture of refusal [. . .] a gesture of rejection of obsolete 
institutions’ (Levinskaia 2012, 27). By playing on specific unease and questions surround-
ing Putin’s militarisation of the public sphere, The Soldier acts as a conduit for raising 
political debate about the state’s use of spectacle as a means to district from the ways in 
which military violence supports governmental structures through its evocation of 
Russia’s bloody involvement in the Second Chechen War, dedovshchina, and conscrip-
tion. Although the performance does not explicitly name or list these subjects, what is 
significant in the play’s exploration of contemporary attitudes towards the Russian army 
is that the act of desertion by a young soldier asks an important question in contempor-
ary Russia: should the country’s youth have the choice about whether to serve in the army 
or not?
In an attempt to explore this, The Soldier does not offer up an explicit answer to the 
question it poses. Instead, Pryazhko and Volkostrelov encourage their audience to fill in 
their own narrative for the soldier’s actions during the performance.11 I contend that the 
production’s form, which challenges preconceived notions of New Drama, is vital in 
generating a discourse about the role of the military in contemporary Russian life. 
Returning to their study of New Drama, Beumers and Lipovetsky conclude that ‘the 
plays discussed in this volume render violence of trauma through language, through the 
interaction between characters, and through the organisation of theatrical performance’ 
(Beumers and Lipovetsky 2009, 301). In The Soldier, it is precisely the lack of ‘language’ 
or dialogic ‘interaction’ that communicates a potential embodied narrative to the audi-
ence. The soldier’s communicative silence throughout the performance hints at an 
ineffable trauma suffered by the young man that provokes important and varied discus-
sion on the role of the army in modern Russia.
Each performance of The Soldier is followed by a post-show discussion between the 
audience and the artistic team behind the production. Although the piece provokes 
a series of question relating to the soldier’s actions and his decision to desert the army, 
the post-show discussions often start with an emotive and heated debate about the form 
of the production. For example, in the post-show conversation that took place on the 
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show’s opening night, audience members interrogated Pryazhko, Volkostrelov, and 
Teatr.doc’s co-founder Ugarov.12 For some audience members, the form the perfor-
mance took was artistically provocative and at odds with their perception of theatre, with 
one speaker asking ‘how is this a viable form of theatre?’ A second raised the issue that 
they did not believe they had watched a piece of theatre, instead contending that ‘this is 
a movie’, while another jokingly asked for a refund of their money. The conversations 
about the performance’s structure often facilitate a more detailed debate on the Russian 
military. In the post-show discussions I have access to and have witnessed at the theatre, 
many of the men in the audience respond to the play by animatedly sharing their own 
experiences of military service, recalling where they were based and considering the 
impact it had on their lives. By challenging the audience’s expectations of what a theatre 
performance is, The Soldier provokes a debate on the nature of the performance that 
subsequently facilitates a wider dialogue about the Kremlin’s privileging of the military in 
Russia.
The staging strategies employed in the production place the audience and the center of 
the work, encouraging each spectator to imagine the action as it occurs offstage and 
implicating them in the moment of the performance. The use of projection as mediation 
in an otherwise empty performance space further renegotiates the ways in which the 
conflicting boundaries between public and hidden citizens have come to be enacted, 
challenging the audience to imagine what is happening outside of what is visible in public 
life and raising crucial questions about the manner in which male soldiers are charac-
terised and imagined in Russia. In addition, Pryazhko’s use of the third person in the only 
lines spoken in the play hints at the wider impact of Putin’s militarised patriotism and the 
continued use of conscription throughout Russian society as a whole. In this way, The 
Soldier acts as a locus of cathartic reflection for audience members to witness, acknowl-
edge, debate, and engage with the impact of conscription not only in a theatrical context, 
but also its impact on themselves and their companions at Teatr.doc that evening. In 
doing so, the performance makes marginalised citizens visible as political subjects, 
enabling the audience to articulate their own experiences and opinions about military 
conscription during the post-show discussions as well as making a crucial contribution to 
the creation of significant new counter-discourses that confront the repressive politics of 
Putinism.
Embodied narratives and hegemonic masculinity
In her 2012 monograph Militarizing Men, Maya Eichler addresses these pertinent 
political anxieties surrounding the Kremlin’s policies of conscription and the role of 
the military in the public sphere, providing a detailed investigation into the impact of the 
Chechen Wars on militarised gender identities. Eichler’s study offers an important 
insight into the development and re-integration of the military’s role in civil society by 
the Putin administration, identifying an active ‘link between military service and patri-
otism’ (Eichler 2012, 85). Drawing on interviews with Chechentsy, Eichler investigates 
‘the relationship between men’s identities and the Russian state’s conscription policy and 
the waging of war in Chechnya’ (Eichler 2012, 3). She contends that Putin’s authority is 
legitimised by his manipulation of the army to emphasise militarised notions of mascu-
linity, foregrounding the political importance of military service and the role of soldiers 
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and war veterans as a contested site of hegemonic masculinity in contemporary Russia. 
Eichler argues that Putin’s ‘ability to portray an image of reinvigorated masculinity’ 
during the Second Chechen War contributed to the restoration of the military in Russian 
politics and public life (Eichler 2012, 56). Putin’s use and appropriation of militarised 
masculinity helped legitimise and gain public approval for the war amongst the electo-
rate: ‘The image of the soldier became personification of Putin’s appeal to the prestige of 
the military [. . .] tighter control of the media coverage during the second war meant that 
the image of the un-heroic conscript soldier was less visible than in the first war’ (Eichler 
2012, 51). Because Chechentsy have been lionised as totemic paragons of masculinity, 
military service, and patriotism for Russia’s younger generations, returning veterans had 
been coerced into conforming to a restrictive paradigm of warrior heroes. Therefore, 
Eichler contends that Chechentsy who do not conform to the normative ideal of ‘tough 
and heroic warriors’ are marginalised by the Kremlin’s official narrative of the war 
(Eichler 2012, 134).
Eichler frames her debates within the hierarchical model of gender that asserts 
patriarchal power defined by R. W. Connell as ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell 1987, 
183–90). Significantly, Connell identifies the military as the most ‘important [institution] 
for the definition of hegemonic masculinity in European/American culture’, and views 
the figure of the hero as central to the Western cultural imagery of masculinity (Connell 
2005, 213). In this way, the military ‘has to be understood in terms of relationships 
between masculinities’ (Connell 1987, 128). This view is shared by David Morgan, who 
identifies the military as significant in the defining of hegemonic masculinity:
Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those 
associated with war and the military are of the most direct. Despite far reaching political, 
social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity. 
(Morgan 1994, 165)
Connell and Morgan’s accounts of the structure of masculinity reveal how the dominant 
discourse around the military and soldiers enforces an idealised hegemon that dominates 
over other forms of subordinate masculinities. By positioning the military as a key 
institution in the construction of hegemonic masculinity, soldiers who do not conform 
to the hegemonic ideal of tough and heroic warriors are marginalised by the Kremlin’s 
official narrative of the Chechen wars and the role of the army in twenty-first century 
Russia.
Eichler builds on Connell’s examination of hegemonic masculinity, noting that the 
term ‘militarised masculinity’ can help explain how the hegemonic order of masculinity 
is constructed and maintained in the military. She argues that the concept of militarised 
masculinity can ‘challenge us to think about how masculinities and men become militar-
ized [. . .] rather than to assume and accept that men are essentially militaristic’ (Eichler 
2012, 7). In this way, Eichler avoids the simplistic assumption that men are naturally 
militaristic or that a there is an inherent link between masculinity and the military. It is 
also important to observe that while there has been a significant increase in female 
soldiers serving in the Russian army which has the potential power to dismantle the 
gendered order inherent in the institution, only a very small minority of women have 
been able to achieve influence and status within the military (Mathers 2006, 211). 
Conversely then, women’s achievements in the armed forces have been deemphasised 
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and marginalised. This has reinforced established gender hierarchies and conventions, 
meaning that the idealised, hegemonic image of the militant warrior maintains it 
dominance. This has been underscored by Eichler, who contends that ‘the link between 
military and the media depict female soldiers in a way that reinscribes the link between 
masculinity and the military’ (Eichler 2012, 74).13 Furthermore, the controversial use of 
male conscript soldiers in the two Chechen wars has placed a greater emphasis on men’s 
role within the military, reinforcing the state’s constructed notion of militarised mascu-
linity and the idea that military service is allied to the concept of becoming a ‘real man’.
The embodied presence of the male actor in The Soldier intersects with the Putin 
regime’s employment of media-friendly PR stunts that saturate contemporary broad-
casting. By challenging the connection between hegemonic masculinity and the success 
of the Putin regime, the production aims to disrupt the state-sanctioned discourse that 
ignores and marginalises young men who do not conform to this ideal. The soldier’s body 
in the form of actor Pavel Chinarev is visible to the audience during almost the entire 
performance both on stage and through the live video stream. Through the projection of 
the video stream, Pryazhko and Volkostrelov highlight how the coverage of military 
intervention such as the Second Chechen War and martial parades have become highly 
mediated by the state through the Kremlin’s co-option of the mass media. As I have 
noted, during the Second Chechen War, Putin completed a number of high profile 
macho stunts that aligned him with the war effort and attempted to propagate him as 
the icon of militarised hegemonic masculinity. Meanwhile, veterans from both Chechen 
Wars have been foregrounded in the public sphere as patriotic heroes who validate 
Putin’s emphasis on military values and conscription. Paradoxically, Pryazhko and 
Volkostrelov challenge these idealised stereotypes of militarised masculinity in the 
embodied enactment of the everyday tasks performed by the soldier. Volkostrelov’s 
directorial focus on the diurnal actions of the character asks the audience to interpret 
the production as more legitimate than the heavily constructed and choreographed 
representations of military vigour presented by pro-Putin youth groups, state news 
reports, and Putin’s own public performances during the Second Chechen War.
The image of the naked male body in the production has further implications for how 
Pryazhko and Volkostrelov use the embodied presence of the actor to engage with militarised 
gender norms. When he exits the shower, the audience’s attention is focused not only on the 
actor’s body but also the green camouflage uniform that is deliberately positioned in their eye 
line stage left. In her article ‘The Structure of Plasticity: Resistance and Accommodation in 
Russian New Drama’, Susanna Weygandt argues that New Drama productions integrate 
‘material objects as actants in the narrative’ (Weygandt 2016, 121). In The Soldier, the material 
presence of the soldier’s military uniform acts in accordance with Weygandt’s observations 
on the contribution of objects in New Drama. Lighting is used to introduce the presence of 
the items halfway through the performance and Volkostrelov creatively uses the uniform as 
a way to progress the narrative of The Soldier. The neatly folded clothes hint that the soldier 
had laid them out planning to dress after his shower only to conceive his final courageous 
decision to desert the army during the action of the piece. The presence of the soldier’s 
uniform reflects Morgan’s observation that ‘often men in public space are, officially or 
unofficially, uniformed as soldiers, policemen, clergy or stockbrokers’ (Morgan 1993, 73). 
Morgan writes that ‘the nature of uniform is then to divert attention away from the 
particularities and idiosyncrasies of specific bodies and to focus on generalised public roles 
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and statuses’ (Morgan 1993, 73). In his public media stunts, Putin dresses in military attire to 
codify and give authority to his performances. It is precisely though the actor’s naked body 
that resistance to this facet of Putin’s leadership is conducted in The Soldier. The live 
embodiment of a naked man stripped of his uniform and status as a soldier is, therefore, 
a transgression that strips away the Kremlin’s fabricated mediatisation of militarised hege-
monic masculinity.
It is worth pointing out, that the soldier’s body in the performance does not in fact 
physically conform to the hegemonic ideal and the claim that ‘the warrior still seems to be 
a key symbol of masculinity’ (Morgan 1994, 165). Chinarev’s body is not muscular or 
physically imposing, and his appearance betrays a youthful inexperience that suggests his 
subordinate status in the hierarchy of hegemonic masculinity (see Image 3). Instead, the 
central focus on the soldier’s body in a silent and intimate space not only acts as 
a rejection of the Kremlin’s theatrical public spectacles but also enables a crucial rene-
gotiation of how militarised hegemonic masculinities have ideologically reaffirmed the 
dominant political narratives controlled by the Putin regime. The use of the embodied 
presence of the male actor contests and disrupts the idealised paradigm of militarised 
hegemonic masculinity promoted by the Kremlin. In a country where soldiers who do 
not conform to the regime’s constructed hegemonic masculinity are excluded from 
public discourse, The Soldier opens up new avenues for debate and opposition towards 
the Kremlin through the staging of marginalised voices and ‘subordinate’ representations 
of the male body in the public sphere. The play, therefore, subverts the mediatised 
portrayals of soldiers’ bodies and makes visible those who have been excluded from 
Putin’s state-building strategies. In doing so, this important act of opposition makes 
a vital contribution towards resisting embodied notions of the warrior hero that define 
contemporary hegemonic masculinities as they have been constructed by the Putin 
regime.
Conclusion
Playwright and co-founder of Teatr.doc, Ivan Vyrypaev, has recently argued that the 
current Russian government ‘has the right to interfere with, control, direct, regulate, 
oversee, and finally, to develop the cultural process’ (Vyrypaev 2018, 40). As the threat to 
freedom of speech in the arts grows under the Putin regime, plays such as The Soldier 
provide a vital site for articulating alternative narratives that challenge and subvert the 
normative discourses propagated by state-controlled media. In her 2009 study Theatre 
Censorship in Britain: Silencing, Censure and Suppression, Helen Freshwater writes that: 
‘it seems that overt censorship can also be an inadvertent spur to creativity’ (Freshwater 
2009, 164). In other words, even when artists are faced with the spectre of censorship, 
they find creative ways of challenging and overcoming state oppression through their art. 
As Putin has implemented a clampdown on the arts, Russia’s innovative theatre makers 
have continued to produce provocative new shows under the increasing threat of censor-
ship. Freshwater’s suggestion that theatre makers will often find creative responses to 
counter the state’s active involvement in arts and culture is manifested in The Soldier as 
the innovative confrontation of Putin’s casting of the Second Chechen War as a grand 
analogy for his own political strength and the state’s relentless propagation of militarised 
patriotism and gender norms. By withholding an explanation for how or why the soldier 
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is deserting the army and removing the immediate spectre of repression from the play, 
The Soldier underscores the ways in which the systematic violence inherent in the 
Russian military invisibly supports nationalist dogma and Putin’s leadership, prompting 
a wider interrogation of the exploitative use of conscript soldiers as a political tool.
Image 3. Pavel Chinarev in The Soldier, Teatr.doc, Moscow, 2011. Photo: Polina Koroleva. Courtesy of 
Teatr.doc.
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This article has argued that Teatr.doc’s production of The Soldier deconstructs the 
established conventions of dramatic writing in twenty-first century Russia, providing 
a significant theatrical critique of the Putin regime’s reiteration of militarised patriotism 
and mandatory conscription in the wake of the Second Chechen War. By exploring the 
production in the context of the New Drama movement, I have suggested that Pryazhko’s 
urgent portrayal of a young soldier in the moment he takes the life-changing decision to 
desert the army assaults its audience’s pre-conceived understanding of dramatic form, 
while the embodied presence of the male actor subversively disrupts the state-sponsored 
media discourse surrounding the Second Chechen War as well as Putin’s own militarised 
public performances. The performative unspoken actions represented in The Soldier calls 
attention to the brutal practice of dedovshchina and the exploitative use of soldiers as 
idealised representations of militarised hegemonic masculinity. I have argued that by 
foregrounding silent and diurnal actions, the understated acts performed in The Soldier 
are presented as micronarratives of dissent and protest again the regime that reject the 
macronarratives of mediatised spectacles of war and militarised masculinity in Putin’s 
Russia. In this way, Pryazhko focuses his audiences’ attention on how marginalised 
citizens can be made visible and provides new alternative subject positions. Despite the 
ephemeral length of the production, it provides a crucial space to reinterpret the politics 
of the Putin regime and intervene in the public sphere.
In providing such a reading of The Soldier, this article has gone beyond previous 
English-language studies into New Drama, which have offered a substantive investigation 
into the movement’s linguistic innovations but have neglected to provide a detailed 
analysis of theatre and performance’s significant contribution to the creation of 
a cohesive oppositional political discourse. In doing so, I have underscored the potential 
of New Drama practitioners to employ innovative theatrical aesthetics to intervene in the 
public sphere and contest the autocratic and nationalistic practices of the Putin regime by 
articulating alternative and dissident experiences excluded from mainstream political 
discourse. While it remains to be seen how playwrights and theatre practitioners will 
continue to respond to further political developments in their art in the future, in the 
wake of Putin’s re-election for a further six years on 18 March 2018, Russian theatre 
makers’ continuing response to the authoritarian politics of the regime remains an urgent 
and important subject in contemporary theatre and performance.
Notes
1. For example, I am Free (Ya Svoboden, 2012), produced by Volkostrelov’s Post Theatre in 
St. Petersburg, took the form of the projection of 535 photographs captured by Pryazhko in 
Minsk, which were accompanied by thirteen captions, sequentially projected every seven 
seconds to create a complete, unspoken story.
2. A notable exception is John Freedman’s article ‘The Art of Seeing: Dmitry Volkostrelov 
Interprets Pavel Pryazhko’.
3. As well as attending the production and the post-show discussions that follow it, I also 
have access to a single camera recording of the piece, as well as a number of transcripts 
of the post-show debates, kindly shared with me by Teatr.doc’s co-founder Elena 
Gremina.
4. For more detail of the Royal Court’s involvement in the development of New Drama, see 
Aston and Thomas (Aston and O’Thomas 2015, 77–83, 136–40).
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5. It should be noted that New Drama was not always positively received in Russia. It received 
harsh opprobrium from both theatre-makers and critics for its perceived lack of artistic 
quality and faced accusations that its association with the Royal Court made it a theatre of 
foreign influence. Interestingly, this cultural unease surrounding the genealogy of New 
Drama expressed by some Russian critics is further marshalled with wider debates elsewhere 
in Europe that articulate pressing concerns about neocolonial performance practices at the 
start of the twenty-first century. For example, see Nikčević (Nikčević 2005).
6. Gremina and Ugarov opened Teatr.doc in central Moscow in 2002; Kazantsev co-founded 
the Playwright and Director Centre along with Mikhail Roshchin in 1998; Kolyada estab-
lished a playwriting course at the Yekaterinburg Theatre Institute in 1994 and subsequently 
opened the Kolyada Theatre in 2001.
7. This point has astutely been made by Duška Radosavljević, who observes that Russian 
theatre directors have a much less text-centered approach to theatre making in general than, 
for example, their associates in the United Kingdom or the United States (Radosavljević 
2013, 53).
8. Mat was a phenomenon that appeared in Russian literature during Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
policy of perestroika in the 1980s as a means of challenging and subverting the linguistic 
constraints of official Soviet discourse. It is defined by Russian literary scholar Eliot 
Borenstein as ‘forbidden words describing the human anatomy, sexual activity, and the 
rest of the physiological functions’ (Borenstein 2008, 58).
9. I use John Freedman’s translation of Pryazhko’s lines as included in Real and Phantom 
Pains: An Anthology of New Drama (Freedman 2014a, 110).
10. Unless otherwise noted, translations in this paper are my own.
11. In his article on Pryazhko and Volkostrelov’s theatre, Freedman describes how ‘two years 
after seeing The Soldier [. . .] I debate questions the director raised but did not answer’ 
(Freedman 2014b, 53).
12. I am grateful to Elena Gremina for sharing with me a number of recordings of the post-show 
discussions staged at Teatr.doc.
13. Eichler’s comments are echoed by Laura Prividera and John Howard, who note that ‘the 
continued ideological essentializing of soldiers as “masculine men” calls into question the 
very legitimacy of the female soldier.’ (Prividera and Howard III 2006, 30).
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